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I know that suffering is the sole nobility 
Which earth and hell shall never mar, 
And that to weave my mystic crown, 
You must tax every age and every universe.  
Baudelaire, The Flowers of Evil, ‘Benediction’ 
 
What does not kill one, makes one stronger. 
Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am So Wise’, 2 
 
Is there, could there be, any miraculous suspension of 
the wearily historic, the dingily geographic, the dully 
drearily sensible beyond her faith, her charm, her 
love, to command? Yes, there could be, yes, alas, 
indeed yes, O there is, right here, right now before us, 
the situation present. 
W.H. Auden, The Sea and the Mirror: A commentary on 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest, ‘Caliban to the Audience’ 
 
A passionate tumultuous age will overthrow everything, pull 
everything down; but a revolutionary age, that is at the same 
time reflective and passionless, transforms that expression 
of strength into a feat of dialectics: it leaves everything standing 
but cunningly empties it of significance.  
Kierkegaard, The Present Age, p.42. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will address the theme of the conference from a particular angle, rendered 
possible by its title. Notice that the title is not about ‘The Social Pathologies in 
Contemporary Civilization’, but ‘The Social Pathologies of Contemporary Civilization’. 
This enables one not simply to address the pathological character of certain aspects of 
the civilisation in which we are living – and here I also want to note the importance of 
the word ‘civilisation’,i
Such a way of approaching the problem might seem a sophistic play with words 
for some and almost indecently broad for others. I am painfully aware that such an idea 
is ‘disturbing’; undermining the easy, comforting certainties of a deep belief in the 
progressive nature of our societies, of ‘us moderns’ (Latour 1991). Yet, this is a question 
that does not cease to preoccupy – even haunt – me since quite a long time, in fact the 
moment I started to work in the Centre for Value Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, guided by Elemér Hankiss, almost 30 years ago. 
Hankiss had an interest in the question of ‘social pathology’, and the term ‘diagnosis’ was 
even used as the title of a book of his that outright became a bestseller in Hungary,
 in contrast to ‘society’ or ‘culture’, much more frequently used in 
sociology, or the social sciences in general – but might pose the question of how an entire 
civilisation may show pathological features.  
ii so in 
a way I’m still only following him. A similar terminology was developed by main 
contemporary social and political thinkers like Michel Foucault or Eric Voegelin.iii
 Being concerned with the problem of a ‘pathological civilisation’ for me – just as 
for them – was not merely an intellectual endeavour, but part of my daily existence. 
Growing up on the other side of the Iron Curtain was an experience that literally 
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everyday made one face the situation that something is wrong in the world in which one 
happens to live. I was living in a world where everything that was not rooted in very local 
and very old traditions was simply turned upside down. 
 At the same time, and also since my university years, I increasingly gained the 
conviction that not only I’m living in a deeply pathological environment, but I am not 
being given the intellectual instruments that would enable me to understand the nature of 
the situation. The official Marxist ideology was evidently bankrupt, but I increasingly 
realised that the ‘alternative’ approaches, starting with ‘critical’ versions of Marxism, but 
including socialism, liberalism, or nationalism, thus the entire set of socio-political 
ideologies bequeathed to us by the French Revolution, were just as unacceptable as 
starting points. I had to keep searching. 
 Over the years, I managed to complement my more experiential than academic 
education in Hungary with a PhD in Austin, Texas, in the 1980s; a visiting fellowship in 
London in 1989/90; and teaching positions in Italy and Ireland since then. However, and 
in spite of all the many differences, I found that two basic aspects of the experiences I 
gained during Communism in Hungary were strangely generalisable: the pathological 
aspects of the civilisation to which we belong cannot be restricted to the countries under 
the sway of Communism – it is an upside down turned world that is being globalised; 
and the dominant intellectual discourses, strangely enough, far from addressing this 
problem, rather share a complicity in this pathology. 
 I am quite aware that at this point it would be easy to charge my position either 
with excessive gloom or rash overgeneralisation. At this moment I can only say that, far 
from following a gloomy, dualistic, Gnostic vision of the world as a realm of irresistible 
evil, my basic outlook is rather close to Plato’s mature work, as expressed with particular 
clarity in the Timaeus; or, in a different terminology, it is inspired by the idea of the 
Harmonia mundi.iv
 Over the years I also encountered with the work of a number of important 
thinkers who found themselves in a similar positions. They were either historically 
oriented social theorists, who realised that they have to find their own path, outside the 
intellectual environment which surrounded them, trying to develop their own intellectual 
tools in order to escape the dominant intellectual currents of neo-Kantianism, positivism, 
Marxism, and psychoanalysis. Such figures include, most prominently, Max Weber, 
Norbert Elias, Eric Voegelin, and Michel Foucault, much influenced by the philosophies 
of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Alternatively, they were anthropologists who also and 
similarly discovered, at the field, that the tools they were given by the Durkheim or 
Marx-inspired teachers were deeply defective; these include Paul Radin, Gregory 
Bateson, or Victor Turner; and who developed a number of crucial tools necessary to 
diagnose, clinically, the pathological features of contemporary civilisation, like liminality, 
the trickster, and schismogenesis. One could also add here Marcel Mauss with his 
discovery of gift relations as being the foundations of social order, and the work of 
Tarde, Girard and Latour on the role of imitation. 
 The problem, as the Auden motto indicates, rather lies with the 
(modern) world in which we live, and in particular with the radical corruptness of the 
intellectual language which we came to inherit, and which – instead of helping us to 
retrieve harmony – manages to push us further away from the very possibility of leading 
a decent, meaningful, shared life, reconfirming and further leading us astray in the dark 
Dantesque forest of pathologies that have become, in the language of Max Weber, our 
fate. 
 In this paper, through historical and conceptual clarification related to health, 
pathology and illness, I’ll investigate the question of the extent to which the pathological 
character of contemporary civilisation is related to the way these concerns are 
approached in our times; revealing an ever more deeper, and even more troubling, 
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suspicion concerning human experience itself – a deep mistrust in the capacities of 
human beings, even a hostility to life, which Nietzsche diagnosed as being at the heart of 
nihilism.  
 
Meanings of health and pathology 
 
Let me start with some clarifications of meaning, related to the terms ‘health’ and 
‘pathology’. Concerning ‘health’, an idea that seems difficult enough, the linguistic results 
will be simple, almost trivial; while concerning ‘pathology’, which on a first instance 
looks a quite straightforward technical word, the results will be rather the opposite. Such 
conceptual clarification is necessary in order to distinguish my approach from the kind of 
functionalist-organic analysis that was used by sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s. From 
this perspective, social life represents a functioning whole, comparable to a watch (using 
the famous metaphor of Steuart which would be taken over by Adam Smith, among 
others), or to an organic body.v
 Far from taking up one or other of the sides in this controversy, I consider this 
entire thematisation, or ‘problematisation’, in the sense of Foucault, as fundamentally 
mistaken; part of the problem, and not the solution. In the language of Bateson, it is the 
result of schismogenic developments within modern thought, that merely mimic 
schismogenic social processes, instead of explaining them and helping to move beyond. 
The reason is that social life cannot and should not be analysed through merely mechanical 
or organic analogies, as – following the perspective of classical political philosophy – the 
aim of social life in not simply ‘order’ or ‘function’, but meaningful social order, or the 
‘good society’, informed by ideas of harmony or the overall beauty of the world. The idea 
of a ‘good society’ does not mean the realisation of some kind of abstract, lifeless utopia, 
but simply maintaining the searching and striving for the joint realisation of inseparable 
ethical and aesthetical values. In this sense, the problems with European social and 
political thought started not with modernity, or even the Enlightenment, but much 
earlier, of which the thinking of Hobbes and even Machiavelli were crucial symptom: 
with the idea that the aim of politics is simply to establish a stable order, without any 
concern with meaning (Voegelin 1999: 153-5). This identifies the period of the collapse 
of the Renaissance as the crucial moment in which European civilisation took a 
pathological turn.
 This metaphor clearly has very limited value, and became 
attacked from the 1960s onwards, though almost exclusively from the perspective that it 
fails to explain the presence of conflict in social life, and even the positive – meaning 
revolutionary – role it might play there. 
vi
 A ‘pathological civilisation’ is one which gives up the pursuit of a meaningful life 
and of the realisation of beauty at the level of the community, which parallels the 
overriding beauty that characterises the world of nature, the plants and animals, seas, 
rivers and mountains that surround us, and which was the aim of human existence at 
least since the Upper Palaeolithic. 
 
 
Terms related to health in most languages have a singular etymological origin, which in 
English ‘health’ is still full visible: they are related to a state of wholeness, or integrity. 
Further examples include Italian salute, rooted – together with words related to ‘salvation’ 
– in a Sanskrit term capturing integrity (sarva); German Gesundheit, rooted similarly in 
integrity or soundness; the term ‘sanity’, going back to terms signifying a certainty of 
oneself, and even the force to resist (see Sanskrit sakami, even connected to the root of 
‘salvation’); or even Hungarian egészség, which literally means ‘whole-ness’, and ép (a very 
basic and short root), which means something not broken, or possessing integrity. We 
must also add that these terms usually also imply aesthetic qualities. 
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 Pathology seems a simple technical term, but its lingustic analysis opens up a new 
horizon. The word shares etymology with a number of terms in modern languages that 
altogether map a very distinct and even striking semantic field. It includes words like 
‘pathetic’ and ‘pathos’, but also ‘passion’ and ‘passive’. The etymological source of all 
these terms is the Greek verb paskho, which means ‘to suffer’, but at the same time also 
‘to experience’. This brings into our analysis the quite stunning fact that for the Greeks 
experience was a passive event, which human beings had to undergo or ‘suffer’, and 
which in this manner exerted a formative impact on their personality.vii It was therefore 
not considered as something humans should be actively searching for; something very 
close to the way in which in some of his last writings Foucault thematised the connection 
between ‘subject’ and ‘experience’.viii
 It also implies something further – and here we arrive, from a seemingly minor 
technical point, into the heart of our analysis. Such an intimate connection between 
suffering and experience implies not only that an exclusively positive, activist, and 
subjective conception of experience is untenable, but that similar kind of considerations 
apply to suffering as well. Eliminating suffering from the world is impossible, at least in 
so far as one does not eliminate at the same time the possibility of genuine human 
experience. This renders evident the pathological character of modern ideologies, and of 
the civilisation that is producing them, because promoting happiness through the 
elimination of all suffering from human life is perhaps the most important legitimating 
ideology of modernity. 
  
 If the ideal is impossible, we need to make a further step and realise that this 
ideal then must be mistaken. Here one must tread carefully, striking the right tone and 
make the right kind of circles in the right direction in the argument, as otherwise it can 
easily be misconstrued. It is evident that in order to become a healthy adult, a child must 
go through a number of unpleasant experiences and disappointments; but this does not 
mean that a well-wishing parent must actively procure suffering and disappointments for 
his child. The reason why eliminating suffering as the central aim of ‘social politics’ is 
wrong is that it pursues an Aristotelian logic of double negation, without realising that is 
so far as the meaning of human and social life is concerned, two negations do not easily 
add up to something positive. By ‘eliminating suffering’, we do not directly and ‘logically’ 
gain something positive; if we promote physical health and longevity as aims on their 
own, this does not necessarily mean that people live a better life, in a ‘good society’. It 
might simply procure boredom, ennui, melancholy, and spleen; which can be explained 
through the etymology of ‘pathology’. The statistical logic of ‘proxy variables’ ignores the 
problem of meaning, and is therefore of extremely limited value in human life. To give 
an example, ‘consumption’ is supposed to be a ‘proxy variable’ to measure happiness, in 
a Benthamite perspective, though by now it is evident that a ‘consumer society’ does not 
bring about overall happiness. The meaning of the term could have been taken as a good 
indicator even here, as ‘consumption’ originally had a medical and pathological sense, 
meaning ‘wasting of the body by disease; wasting disease’. 
 The radically problematic nature of the way in which modern ideologies, both 
liberal and socialist, systematically confuse positive aims and meanings with the mere 
elimination of negative experiences can be demonstrated through the ideas of John 
Rawls – widely considered as one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th 
century. I would like to claim that the central argument of his most famous work, A 
Theory of Justice is simply wrong – though it ‘seems’ or ‘sounds’ right, being most 
‘attractive’, just as the voice of the Sirens. Rawls argues that the basic standard by which 
any public policy should be measured is the benefit it brings to the well-being of the 
‘least advantaged’ member of society. The idea ‘sounds’ plainly right, in conformity with 
our basic values of justice, charity and pity. Certainly politics must do something not just 
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for the majority, but also for those who are emarginated. Yet, something with it clearly is 
not right – and actually helps us understand why Nietzsche, the greatest thinker of the 
modern age, placed such an emphasis in his critique of Christianity on the problematic 
nature of ‘pity’ or ‘compassion’ (Mitleid). If we accept that politics is ‘basically’ about 
helping the least well off members of society, then politics becomes – as it indeed has 
become, with frightening consequences, in the modern world – deprived of any positive 
value, thus of any meaning. There is no common good, no community, no pursuit of 
beauty at the level of the whole, except the promotion of the ‘interests’ of individuals. 
Quite strikingly, through the ideas of Rawls, liberalism became all but identical with 
radical Marxism: once everybody will be equal with everybody else, there will be no ‘least 
well off’ members of society, politics will cease to exist, just as the state, classes, 
philosophy, economics, and everything else, and we’ll enter a universal state of bliss.  
 
Starting by trying to understand the meaning of pathology, beyond the functionalist-
organic paradigm, and taking some cues from etymology, we arrived at a first diagnosis 
of the pathology of modernity. The problem of modernity lies not at the level of means – 
the scarcity of resources, the impossibility of satisfying the inspiration of everybody – but 
at the level of ends.  
This is where the meaning of health must be analysed in more detail. 
 
Canguilhem on health and the pathological 
 
In order to gain a more in-depth conceptual and historical understanding of ‘health’ and 
‘pathology’, I now turn to the French historian and philosopher of science Georges 
Canguilhem, in particular his classic book Le normal et le pathologique.ix Michel Foucault 
repeatedly stated that – together with Georges Dumézil – Canguilhem was the most 
important thinker having an impact on his work (and not Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, or Sartre);x
For Canguilhem pathology, just as health, is a function of the whole organism, 
and it cannot be broken down into pieces (Canguilhem 1978: 7). The ‘normal’ state is 
being healthy exactly in the sense of living according to certain norms. The crucial 
question concerns the exact status of the organism with respect to these norms – which 
goes at the heart of the meaning of ‘life’, or living. 
 
and he wrote the Introduction to the 1978 English edition of the book. In this piece 
Foucault argues that the central value of the particularly French interest in the history of 
science – an approach to which also belong Gaston Bachelard, another thinker held in 
the highest esteem by Foucault, and Bruno Latour, one of the most important 
contemporary social theorists – is that it represents a self-overcoming of French 
Cartesian rationalism, which implies the recognition that rationalism ‘has its own history 
of dogmatisms and despotisms’, and that therefore it can ‘only have a liberating effect 
[effet d’affranchissement] if it manages to free itself of itself [se libérer d’elle-même]’ (Foucault 
1994, III: 433). 
 Health, for Canguilhem, is not identical with the absence of disease and the 
ensuing suffering – just as life, in extremis, cannot be defined as the opposite of death; it 
cannot even be reduced to the ‘meeting of needs’ or the ‘satisfaction of desires’, other 
standard terms from the dictionary of the social sciences. Life is rather a quantum of 
energy at the disposal of an organism, which is always in excess of its needs (Canguilhem 
1966: 177); in fact, Canguilhem defines a healthy human being as a living organism that is 
exceeding its needs; who is literally insatiable (Canguilhem 1978: 95; Canguilhem 1966: 
109).xi It is exactly this basic feature of human nature which requires that some choices 
be made concerning the actions to be pursued; it is in order to curtail their excesses – 
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necessary for health – that human beings need to give themselves norms which would 
delimit and structure their experiences (Canguilhem 1966: 177).  
 The central question now concerns the nature of these norms, and the 
individuals’ relations to these norms. Here Canguilhem offers a radical critique of the 19th 
century positivist version of ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ medicine, as championed by 
Comte, Claude Bernard and Virchow (Canguilhem 1978: 13, 125). According to 
Canguilhem, the norms that render a healthy human life possible cannot be imposed 
from the outside, by following a type of thinking that combines a reduction of norms to 
positive laws, characteristic of Kelsenian legal theory, with a similar positivistic 
reductionism of medicine to technology (Ibid.: 13, 69-70).xii
 This, of course, does not mean that individual human beings are monads 
following their own purely internal motivations or norms; rather, living organisms 
establish such norms in reactions to the environment in which they live (Ibid.: 72). 
Healthy, normal – meaning norm-setting – life is therefore always reactive, or re-acting. 
It is in this context that we can understand the meaning of illness, and the true nature of 
the challenge that it represents. Pathological organisms also live; and in so far as they live, 
they must follow certain norms. Disease does not mean the absence of norms, but the 
following of inferior norms: norms that do not tolerate a change in the external 
conditions, rendering the organism non-reacting (Canguilhem 1966: 106). A pathological 
organism simply becomes unable to respond to the external environment by the setting 
up of new norms, or by restoring the norms that it lost, due to illness (Canguilhem 1978: 
8). For any healthy human being a disease can be considered as a testing, which it can win, 
and by this demonstrate its own health; while in the absence of such challenges it will be 
assailed by boredom and anxiety (Canguilhem 1966: 177; see also Csikszentmihályi 1975). 
This helps us understand the true significance of illness, and thus realise that a society 
where illness would be eradicated is not simply a utopian ideal in the sense that, 
unfortunately, it cannot be realised, but positively a nightmare. 
 Health implies the capacity 
of an organism to establish or create norms (Canguilhem 1966: 115-7), which must be a 
spontaneous effort of the living being, not imposed from the outside. Quêtelet’s famous 
idea concerning the ‘average’ as normal views processes from the wrong end. Rather the 
opposite is true: the fact that there is an average should be considered as the sign that a 
norm exists (Canguilhem 1978: 86). In other terms, the norm has originality with respect 
to the statistical average (Ibid.: 103). It cannot be defined ‘objectively’, from the outside, 
rather life itself has a normative character (Ibid.: 104). The central issue therefore 
concerns not external evaluation, but the ability of an organism to establish norms, and 
live accordingly (Ibid.: 70). 
From this perspective disease is a bad response, or an error; though at the next 
cycle in the wonders of life, even a bad response, like a genetic mutation – which 
originally is a particularly bad response, a monstrosity – can end up producing a new type 
of organism, which can establish a new norm. Disease is thus fundamentally a question 
of biological value, and not of objective science (125).  
 
From organic health to social wellbeing  
 
Canguilhem’s work helps us to overcome jointly both sides of the schismogenic 
intellectual field of contemporary social thinking, with rationalism, exteriority, 
objectivism and positivism on the one hand, and utopian idealism, social critique and the 
cult of suffering on the other. The question now concerns the way in which his ideas 
could be transplanted at the level of social life.  
 The first point to consider here is that in the social sense as well a human being 
can only be healthy if one is able to posit, or pose in front of oneself, one’s own positive 
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goals.xiii
 The second question concerns now the social aspect of a meaningful life. One 
might argue that while living organisms might be able to set their own norms, for human 
beings it is necessary that such norms be harmonised through external constraint. This is 
the very definition of a ‘social fact’ as offered by Durkheim in his – neo-Kantian, 
legalistic – social theory. The argument, however, is wrong again, as it is formulated from 
a presumed ‘external’ perspective, which also means from inside the rationalistic/ 
utilitarian/ individualist paradigm. This assumes that the life-goals of individuals only 
incorporate the goals of others as if from the outside, as external ‘conditions’ that must 
be taken into account. However, the social dimension was already incorporated in the 
term meaning, and in two different ways: first, because meaning assumes language, and 
language is already social; and second, because any aspect of life and activity can only 
become meaningful if it is recognised as such, in the sense of Pizzorno (1987, 1991, 2000), 
by those who matter for the individual human being, and who therefore constitute that 
‘circle of recognition’ which defines one’s own identity.
 Apart from being irreducible to the mere absence of negative considerations, it is 
also different from the perspective of economic theory with its utility maximisation 
principle. This theory assumes as a fact the highly peculiar norm that an individual must 
always exist on its limits, thus eliminating that cushion of excess which is a precondition 
of health, and actually pushes, in the manner of a performative speech act, all individuals 
within such an ‘economic society’ onto the limit. In contrast to this, and in plain 
language, a healthy life implies a meaningful life, as it is only those acts which a human 
being can accept as meaningful, in which he participates with his own being, instead of 
simply ‘going through the motions’, that can give the kind of satisfaction that is necessary 
for health and happiness. 
xiv
The argument can be further supported from a most surprising perspective, the 
question of pleasure. From the perspective of ‘rational choice’ or philosophical 
liberalism, any concern with meaningful life is usually brushed aside by claims that 
‘rational’ human beings simply aim to satisfy their own interests; something which is 
connected – since the classical utilitarianism of Bentham – to the search for pleasure and 
the avoiding of pain. However, etymology, this central auxiliary science of social 
thinking, again helps us by offering a different perspective. The PIE root *ger means 
pleasure, source of the Greek word charis, which itself is at the origin of modern terms 
like grace or gratitude. This meaning has two main characteristics that are radically 
different from the Benthamite one: pleasure as charis is inherently social, as it presumes 
the company of others who are also pleased; and it is just as inherently aesthetic, as it 
assumes beauty, or aesthetically pleasing qualities. In the world of classical Greece, socio-
political, ethical and aesthetic considerations could not be separated from each other in 
so far as a healthy social life was concerned; they were part of a whole. Thanks to Plato, 
we also know who were the figures of the ancient world who effectively, and 
successfully, worked on such a separation: the Sophists. 
 Without recognition, there is 
no identity, whether at the individual or social level. Whatever a human being thinks 
about oneself, which is not recognised by significant other persons, is as meaningful, and 
effective, as if we declare ourselves the sovereign state of Freedonia. The norms of any 
decent human community were not the results of a deliberative legislation which was 
then imposed from above and the outside on everyone, but grew out – not ‘organically’ – 
of those aspects of social life that were considered as meaningful, and thus became as 
norms the conditions of possibility of meaningful human life. 
 
Now we are in a better position to understand what is wrong with Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 
and the entire ‘politics of suffering’ of which it is a part. The theory represents a peculiar 
collusion between radical liberalism and radical democracy (or socialism), which concerns 
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the ignoring of the positive and meaningful aims of human life. In spite of all differences, 
both philosophical positions assume that the aims of human life are trivial, and at any 
rate beyond the possibility of a rational discourse. For liberal economists, as formulated 
with particular, ruthless clarity in a famous piece by two Noble price winners, ends are a 
matter of pure taste; they cannot be disputed (Becker and Stigler 1977). Human beings 
have so many different goals that all these certainly cannot be satisfied at the same time. 
Political or social questions can be reduced to the allocation of scarce resources that are 
at our disposal to satisfy various needs, aim, goals or desires, following the well-known 
logic of the happiness of the greatest numbers, and the freedom to pursue one’s own 
‘autonomous desires’. Radical democrats think in exactly the same manner concerning 
the ends, but they either consider that therefore – following the principle of equal rights 
and justice – all resources should be completely equally distributed; or, following a more 
‘realistic’ perspective, they take up the plight of those who currently receive less, and thus 
suffer more, and try to alleviate this injustice. Both positions formulate extremely 
appealing and attractive arguments – in fact, it is safe to say that at the level of pure 
arguments neither radical liberalism, nor radical socialism can be defeated, as there are no 
totally convincing arguments against them (who could oppose freedom or fairness?). 
One might only point to the disasters to which they lead, whenever put into practice; 
though ideologues would always say that it was not tried well, or hard enough. Yet, both 
simply fail to consider the question of how positive aims, norms or values can actually be 
formulated and put into practice in a community, which would produce jointly a much 
more pleasurable and meaningful life for everybody. In my view, this is the central 
question concerning health and pathology in contemporary civilisation; and it is due to 
the failure of posing such questions that this our civilisation not only contains 
pathological aspects, but is thoroughly pathological. 
 
But what is the way in which the discussion of ends is formulated in contemporary social 
theory? Let me refer here to the ideas of two of the most important social thinkers of the 
past century, who – though rarely discussed together – share a number of common 
features. Both of them are considered among the most famous figures in their respective 
fields, sociology and economics; in fact, it is easy to argue that they were the single most 
important sociologist and economist of the past century. Yet, both are not only widely 
and doggedly criticised, from the left as from the right, but arguably the mainstream 
perspective of their respective disciplines seriously misrepresented their ideas, and 
proclaimed this travesty as the ‘official’ canon. By now I guess everybody realised that 
I’m talking about Max Weber and John Maynard Keynes. Here I will focus on one aspect 
of their work, though easily a most important one: the social nature of a crucial aspect of 
individual ‘rational’ action, expectations. 
 
Max Weber 
 
Concerning Max Weber, I will restrict my attention to two of his best known passages 
from the start of Economy and Society that are – I very much hope – taught in every 
sociology course anywhere. These define sociology, social action, and the rationality of a 
social action. First of all, Weber defines sociology as a science that deals with the meaning 
of social action (Weber 1978: 4). Though Weber uses the unfortunate neo-Kantian 
adjective ‘subjective’, I would argue that what Weber really has in mind, through DIlthey 
and Nietzsche, is something very close to Canguilhem’s definition of health: a participatory 
and energetic involvement of the human being, which therefore is not fully accessible from 
a purely ‘external’ and ‘objective’ perspective.xv Now the question, especially given the 
language of ‘subjective’, is how such an action can be social – and here Weber uses, at 
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first only implicitly, and then explicitly and repeatedly, the term ‘expectation’ [Erwartung] 
(Weber 1978: 4, 24; 1972: 1, 8). An action is ‘social’ in the sense that it must take into 
account – in order to be meaningful – the action of the others, thus implying certain 
expectations about their behaviour, which therefore would orient one’s actions. In the 
definition of the types of social action, Weber explicitly uses the word ‘expectation’ in 
order to characterise ‘instrumentally rational’ [zweckrational] action, which means that the 
acts of others become pure ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for attaining one’s own ‘rationally 
calculated’ ends. 
 The question of the ‘rationality’ of ends, however, involves huge question marks, 
partly reflected in the well-known fact that zweckrational was translated as ‘instrumentally 
rational’, instead of ‘end-rational’, as this does not seem to have a meaning in English – a 
huge paradox in itself. It alludes to the fact that Weber was trying, as always, to 
incorporate the problem of the posing of ends into his sociology, as leaving it out would 
have made his work a new exercise in sophistry; yet, he was not able to fully leave behind 
the ‘rationalist’ neo-Kantian philosophical perspective into which he was trained, even 
though he knew it only to well that the problem of ends cannot be ‘rationally’ solved.  
 
The questions of expectations and rationality also return at the heart of the work of 
Keynes. 
 
John Maynard Keynes 
 
I will shortly resume here the main ideas of the General Theory (Keynes 1964[1936]), as 
related to the role of expectations, with the help of an article Keynes wrote shortly after 
the publication of his book in response to his critics Keynes (1937). The similarities with 
Weber’s argument, and framework, are striking. First of all, Keynes starts his argument 
by alluding to a basic distinction between ordinary situations – which classical economic 
theory assumes always apply – and situations of crisis (Keynes 1937: 209), which was the 
current situation, then as now, recalling Weber’s fundamental distinction between the 
‘ordinary’ and the ‘out-of-ordinary’ [außeralltägliche] (Weber 1978: 400-1; 1972: 245-6). A 
‘general theory’ means nothing else for Keynes than a kind of theoretical framework that 
applies for both types of situations; in the analogy of non-linear programming, of which 
linear programming is just a special case.xvi
 Going into some details, expectations concerning the future in economic terms 
mean the expected return of investment, which depend on general expectations 
concerning the future (1964: 136, 141). If such expectations change from confidence to 
precariousness (Ibid.: 148-53), relatively minor displacements could escalate into major 
changes, due to the impact on the market for investment goods (Ibid.: 156). 
Expectations about the future always contain a great deal of irrational components; but 
such uncertainty has increased in the then recent past, due to the separation of 
ownership and control, which led to increased speculation, thus provoking phenomena 
that can only be understood in terms of mass psychology (Ibid.: 154, 170). Ignorance and 
facing unexpected situations can lead to sudden and violent reactions (Ibid.: 154). Keynes 
makes particularly strong claims against speculation, so it is important to add here that 
 This distinction is especially important with 
respect to the possibility of foreseeing the future, concerning both the consequences of 
our acts (recalling Weber’s basic preoccupation about the unintended consequences of 
social actions); and expectations about what is going to happen, or how others will act 
(Keynes 1937: 213-4). As such uncertainties concerning the future constitute the very 
bases of our expectations, these expectations can change, and even quite violently, which 
might produce a situation of crisis (Ibid.: 204-5). According to Keynes, this constitutes 
the key issue in economic theory (Ibid.: 205). 
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‘expectation’ (ex-spectare) and ‘speculation’ (speculatio) share the same etymological root, 
which is to visualise or envision, recalling also the term ‘spectator’, so fundamental both 
for Descartes and Adam Smith. This is important for two reasons: first, because it 
establishes a contrast between participation and merely external ‘observation’ or 
‘watching’; and second, due to the implied emphasis on the visual as opposed to the 
verbal-rational component. Modern economics, and the modern economic system itself, 
boasts itself of being ‘rational’; yet, its description amply uses terms more applicable to 
crowd spectacles, like vulgar comedies or even fair-ground entertainment. From such a 
perspective, it is particularly striking that Keynes outright uses the metaphor of marriage 
as model for a proper attitude to investment: ‘The spectacle of modern investment 
markets has sometimes moved me towards the conclusions that to make the purchase of 
an investment permanent and indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or 
other grave cause, might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils’ (Keynes 1964: 
160).xvii
 Given such uncertainty about the future, the crucial question of economics 
concerns the manner in which the future is mediated, in monetary terms, towards the 
present. This is where the significance of the interest rate lies. The etymology of this 
word is again most important, as inter-esse means ‘being in between’, i.e. between the 
future and the present. The size of the interest rate calculates the size of the risk – the 
higher the risk concerning future earnings, the greater is the rate of interest. But it also 
has a mediating influence concerning the past. The results of past earnings are 
accumulated in wealth, including various assets and liquid money. It is this liquid money 
that can be invested with an eye towards future earnings – but which, in the case of 
worsening expectations, might simply be hoarded. In this sense, argues Keynes, the rate 
of interest rewards not so much not-spending (i.e. not-consuming), as not-hoarding 
(Keynes 1964: 174). Once speculation starts to play an excessive role in the markets, 
expectations concerning the future might shift violently, leading to an increased 
willingness to hoard, especially at the margins (Keynes 1937: 209, 217), which could have 
deleterious consequences for the economy. The role of the government is to maintain, at 
all costs, stability at the level of investments, assuring overall responsibility (Keynes 1964: 
164). 
 
 We can now see how tragically – or, if you like, comically – wrong ‘rational 
expectations theory’ is, both in its critique of Keynes and the role of the government or 
the state, and in its own self-contradictory central idea, which became a cornerstone of 
‘rational choice theory’. Expectations simply are not ‘rational’ – just as strictly speaking 
‘rational choice’ is an expression that makes no sense, confusing the inside and the 
outside perspectives, the question of ends and means, the origins of tastes and the power 
of reason to limit and shape desires – and are especially not rational in a state of crisis. 
The rule of ‘rational expectations theory’ over the past decades in economics represents 
not so much the ‘return of the repressed’, but the ‘return of the refuted’; just as the same 
applies true for the combination of evolutionist positivism and Marxist criticism that 
returned to rule sociology after Weber. Apart from misleading, and in a serious manner, 
economic policy, the economists of the ‘Chicago’ and ‘Minnesota’ schools created an 
oblivion about the fact – which even Weber and Keynes failed to emphasise sufficiently 
– that expectations in a society are fundamentally not about economic calculations and 
profits, but rather about the general structure of social conduct, at a level that is much 
more basic, and much more important, than the level of law. Most importantly, such 
expectations are related to the norms in vigour in a particular society, which – we have 
seen this – are the most important elements for healthy living. The central issue concerns 
the extent to which members of that society can be expected behave according to such 
norms. Normality or normativity is thus not about rewards and punishments concerning 
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certain acts, but about the conditions of possibility of meaningful life, thus the 
foundations of a community. It is in this sense that Georg Simmel considered sociability, 
and Marcel Mauss gift relations, as foundational for social life. 
 In order to better investigate the social significance of expectations, I now turn to 
an essay by Reinhart Koselleck, a German political historian and theorist who – apart 
from Foucault – made the most important contribution to the historical analysis of 
systems of thinking – thus, a historisation of Kantian categories – in recent decades.xviii 
 
It 
will also help us return to our starting point and central question, the problem of health 
and experience. 
Koselleck on experience and expectations 
 
Koselleck’s essay studies jointly ‘experience’ and ‘expectations’ (Koselleck 1985). For 
Koselleck, these two concepts are fundamental for historical understanding, as they 
constitute a conceptual pair that captures, in its full asymmetry, the relationship between 
the past and the future, through the present. Experiences, as remains or memories of 
lived reality, are ‘present past’ (Ibid.: 272), as they bring the past into presence; while 
expectations are ‘future made present’ (Ibid.), thus bringing the future into the present 
through imagination.xix
 This distinction has a crucial significance concerning the self-understanding of 
modernity as a distinctly new kind of historical moment, where – so it is argued – all past 
experiences suddenly lose their relevance and value.
 The asymmetry between the two is thus evident, as the two 
presences are distinct (Ibid.: 273). Expectations can also be defined as ‘anticipated forms 
of experiences’ (Ibid.: 272); and Koselleck even calls this asymmetry as a ‘fundamental 
anthropological supposition’ (Ibid.: 288). It is perhaps best visible through the difference 
between ‘memory’ and ‘imagination’: memories are traces of what one has lived through, 
but what has now passed, and which implies a fair bit of hardship and suffering; while 
images are pure figments of fantasy, they have no weight, and so easy can carry one 
away. What the two share, however, and again, is the overwhelming importance of the 
visual element. Our lived memories are stored away in our mind in the forms of images, 
and so they can be easily interfered with by other kind of images, like mechanical 
reproductions (especially photographs), or attractive fantasies sketched about a 
supposedly bright future. 
xx Given the imbalance between the 
presence of the past – lived and ‘suffered’ as an experience – and of the future – 
‘imagined’ as expectation of a blissful state to come – in any contemporary/ present 
moment, the shift of focus from the past to the future, following an ideology of a 
progress, can be identified as a par excellence Sophist trick: operating through ‘image-
magic’ (Szakolczai 2007b), or the flipping of attractive visions of the future, through 
rhetorical discourse.xxi
 The question is, whether at that moment they will be searching for an even 
shrewder illusionist, believing in an even more thorough elimination of all sufferings 
from the world – in the future that is always receding at the horizon, as Koselleck 
reminds us of the old joke about Comrade Khrushchev (Koselleck 273); trading in their 
 The trick works perfectly, at least for a time, until the past is 
reduced to an ‘image’ of pure suffering, and in contrast the future can be presented as a 
flawless realm of utopian purity, where all the sufferers of the past will be redeemed for 
their sufferings. The problem is that, after a time, people start to get worried and demand 
the promised land of happiness, or at least a piece of the pie, right here and right now. 
This is when they will have to realise that they have been taken in for a ride in the name 
of progress, and that much of the life they could have lived is already gone. This is what 
happened in the ‘East’ by about the 1980s; and this is perhaps what is happening, mutatis 
mutandis, now in the ‘West’. 
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vision of progress for a supposedly necessary and ever accelerating spiral of change 
(Ibid.: 184); or finally deciding to live a healthy and meaningful life. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I can only offer here a few provisional concluding remarks.  
 
1. There is no objective science of health; such an idea is itself pathological, and is very 
much part of the pathological nature of the civilisation in which we live. 
 
2. This fact is hidden through the mobilising value of expectations about the future, the 
central technique of social image-magic both in liberal and socialist ideologies, whether in 
the form of individualised images about the future (the ‘American dream’), or through 
collective, socialist utopia-visions, which systematically devalue the past and community 
traditions, rendering individuals alienated from their own home-world. 
 
3. Human beings can only be healthy in healthy societies, which implies a life focused on 
the concrete and personal, driven by inner energy and not the elimination of real or 
imagined negative situations, saturated with meaning that can only emerge through 
participation in communities, or ‘circles of recognition’, which are stable over time – 
stability being a function of experienced life, and not externally imposed ideologies or 
standards. 
 
  
Notes 
 
i For the recent interest in civilisational analysis, see Arjomand and Tiryakian (2004), 
Arnason (2003), Arnason, Eisenstadt and Wittrock (2005). 
ii The book came out first in 1982, and already by 1983 a third edition was published. 
iii Foucault frequently used the word ‘diagnosis’ in the interviews he gave in the 1970s 
(see Foucault 1980); while Voegelin coined to expression ‘pneumapathology’ in order to 
characterise certain aspects of modern life and thought (see Voegelin 1978). 
iv About a recent version of such a position, see the writings of Karen Blixen. 
v About this, see in particular the ideas of Saint-Simon and Cabanis (Procacci and 
Szakolczai 2003). 
vi I try to reconstruct this dynamics in two book projects, one published about the 
Renaissance (Szakolczai 2007a), and an ongoing project about the geneaology of comedy, 
which – taking another guiding idea from Nietzsche, which follows the motto used in 
this paper, stating that “Not by wrath does one kill, but by laughter” (Nietzsche, Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Part I, ‘On Reading and Writing’) – will argue that the European 
Renaissance was literally killed off by low-level comedy, in the form of Commedia dell’Arte, 
which was brought into Europe through Venice after the sack of Constantinople in 1453; 
just as something similar happened with classical Athens and Rome. 
vii See also Hungarian, with the close similaritities between ‘suffering’ (szenvedés) and 
‘passion’ (szenvedély). 
viii About this, see in particular the Introduction to the second volume of the History of 
Sexuality series, and a series of late interviews. 
ix First edition 1943; second, expanded edition 1966; English translation 1978; 
republished 1989. 
x The influence of Canguilhem on Foucault was always emphasised by Paul Rabinow. 
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xi See also Kerényi’s ideas about indestructible life (Kerényi 1976). 
xii About Kelsen and neo-Kantianism, see Szakolczai (forthcoming). 
xiii Interestingly, etymology again guides us in the way, as the etymology of ‘positive’ is 
exactly to ‘pose’ or ‘posit’ something, in the sense of ‘placing’ or ‘putting’. 
xiv Pizzorno’s work is also fundamental both in its critique of the ‘rational choice’ 
perspective (Pizzorno 1986, 1991, 2006), and in its emphasis on the importance of a 
participating component in order to asses the question of the ‘rationality’ of a particular 
social phenomenon (Pizzorno 2007). 
xv On the dynamics of involvement and detachment, see also the basic work of Norbert 
Elias (1987). 
xvi Or, as Keynes argues at the end of Chapter 3, ‘[i]t may well be that the classical theory 
represents the way in which we should like our Economy to behave. But to assume that 
it actually does so is to assume our difficulties away’ (Keynes 1964: 34). 
xvii Notice here also the term ‘spectacle’, to round up the previous argument. I might also 
argue that our civilisation turned in the exact opposite manner: instead of modelling 
economic investment on marriage, it is rather modelling marriage on economic 
investment – of course, in the name of individual freedom, autonomy, the right to escape 
suffering, and rational choice. 
xviii Note also the term ‘pathogenesis’ in the subtitle of Koselleck’s most famous work – 
which in its title, by the way, has ‘critique’ and ‘crisis’. 
xix Interestingly enough, Koselleck does not use the word ‘image’, so I had to 
complement his analysis here with the results of the previous conceptual and 
etymological analysis of ‘expectation’.  
xx See Koselleck’s chapter on Neuzeit (modernity) in the same volume, just before the 
chapter on experiences and expectations. 
xxi Plato’s work, through its emphasis on the combination of images, theatrical devices, 
and rhetorical discourse by the Sophists is fundamental here. One should also add here 
that the title of what is considered as Dickens’s most perfect novel, comparable to 
Dostoevsky’s Demons, is Great Expectations. 
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